The planning of nearly all military campaigns has included, at least in part, the consideration of the participation of friendly indigenous forces or assets. From the North African Indigenous assets will continue to be incorporated into the battlefield. The value of incorporating the indigenous asset is multi-faceted, both during and after combat operations. It will continue to be incumbent upon the U.S. strategist to identify unique ways in which to incorporate these individuals or units to maximize their effectiveness on the battlefield. Training, vetting and battlefield engagement of the indigenous force begins a series of steps culminating in conflict termination and subsequently conflict resolution or restoring freedom and selfgovernance in the conflict nation. The U.S. military's initial contact with indigenous assets can be critical to not only the efficiency and expediency of conflict termination, but also to enforcing
Incorporation of the Indigenous Asset on the Battlefield
The planning of nearly all military campaigns has included, at least in part, the consideration of the participation of friendly indigenous forces or assets. From the North African Campaign (Operation Torch) to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the number and specific tactical responsibilities of the indigenous assets in theater have varied but generally have continued to increase. Just as the responsibilities of the indigenous force have continued to change over time, so have the responsibilities incumbent upon the U.S. military establishment in determining the appropriate integration and handling of this local asset, based upon respective inherent factors.
Indigenous assets will continue to be incorporated into the battlefield. The value of incorporating the indigenous asset is multi-faceted, both during and after combat operations. It will continue to be incumbent upon the U.S. strategist to identify unique ways in which to incorporate these individuals or units to maximize their effectiveness on the battlefield. Training, vetting and battlefield engagement of the indigenous force begins a series of steps culminating in conflict termination and subsequently conflict resolution or restoring freedom and selfgovernance in the conflict nation. The U.S. military's initial contact with indigenous assets can be critical to not only the efficiency and expediency of conflict termination, but also to enforcing the security environment during the conflict resolution phase of the operation. While the U.S. military may enter a country with a phased strategy, the indigenous asset is fighting for the survival of his country and the success of both conflict termination and the conflict resolution are legacies which indigenous personnel will have to address in the future.
The validity of intra-theater assistance to a nation in defending its sovereign rights versus unilateral U.S. military action in a country was clearly stated in the 1969 Nixon Doctrine. 1 The approach of the Nixon Doctrine, that of a reduction in "costs" …introduced a "new direction in
American policy" as it…focused upon "the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense." In other words, this policy sought "to assist another nation defend its freedom…but not fight the war for them." 2 Even though this policy statement was presented during the turbulent period of the Vietnam Conflict, adherence to its principles has continued to define America's pursuit to further democracy and defend those most victimized by its absence. While the Nixon Doctrine laid the framework, it did not, however, provide specifics regarding the use of indigenous forces nor did it address their numerous respective internal factors which differentiate them and, subsequently have a significant impact upon their handling, on and off the battlefield.
It is timely to consider the incorporation of friendly indigenous forces or assets into theater warfare as it is practiced today as an offset to increased demands of both manpower and resources and the costs of developing technologies. Undoubtedly, the indigenous fighter's contribution to the applied battlefield strategy can include invaluable information on the terrain, geo-political dynamics and additional, although less technically and professionally capable, manpower. In using indigenous forces, the U.S. military is tasked with the employment of appropriate vetting techniques which must be adopted to corroborate the information and evaluate capabilities that might be provided by potentially previously unknown local assets. The superior U.S. fighting force is also obligated to provide training in military hardware and tactical techniques as required. Language barriers must be overcome in order to meet these essential pre-battlefield requirements. The willingness of the indigenous population to assist the U.S.
military is based in part upon the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" concept, thus, their commitment and performance on the battlefield is directly related to that relationship and must be carefully considered. Being "casualty phobic" is not peculiar to U.S. leadership and can be expected of the leadership and the respective populace of any coalition member. Technological advances have and will continue to consume a large portion of a country's national budget. Many of these advances may be designed to maximize the effectiveness of air power to reduce the need for massive ground support elements. In spite of these advances, battlefield casualties are a reality. As these advances are applied on the battlefield, the proper "fit" for the indigenous fighter may become more difficult to achieve. As technology advances, it must guarantee it is both adaptable and flexible to permit use by less sophisticated participants. These components of technical advances will continue to be essential to the coordination of close and long-range tactics on the battlefield, especially the integration of indigenous assets into this equation.
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As stated before, there is a definite role for the indigenous forces and the value of this role in both close combat and in support of long-range precision strikes should be carefully evaluated. If Record's thesis is accepted, in close combat, willing and able bodies can provide a casualty barrier, but, this is not the sole prerequisite for incorporating indigenous forces in a theater strategy. The intelligence provided by these sources may contribute to both ground combat operations as well as the exactness of precision air strikes. Both the Rand study and
Record's proposed modification of force structure suggest means of configuring combined resources -technical and human -to minimize time on the battlefield while maximizing results.
As is necessary, and for every phase of the campaign, these local assets must be assessed, vetted and tested. This process can be time-consuming and is often hindered by language and cultural differences. Nevertheless, a process must be followed, especially when 9 Ibid., 11-12. See also Biddle, [42] [43] indigenous forces are relied upon to provide information which could (a) potentially endanger U.S. lives and/or (b) expend costly materiel and other resources.
The willingness and even acceptability of indigenous forces to cooperate with the U.S.
and ultimately their successful integration into a major combat operation is contingent upon a number of factors. Many of the factors characteristic of a failed or failing state such as, regional tribal delineations, international isolation and depressing economic conditions can either facilitate or hinder U.S. objectives. In Afghanistan while the goal of anti-Taliban forces to oust an oppressive regime served as a motivating factor for their cooperation with U.S. forces, it was a cooperation that required remuneration over an extended period of time in the form of cold hard cash, uniforms, weapons, etc.
America's New Threat: The Failed or Failing State
Since the end of the Cold War, the threat to America's overall security at home and abroad (with the exception of the Oklahoma City bombing), has increasingly been from divergent political ideologies nurtured in failed states. 10 While the argument could be made that it is precisely these weak and failed states that offer the most fertile ground or the greatest pool of indigenous forces or surrogates, the nature of the failed state must also be considered. Just as U.S. involvement is based upon specific events, threats or concerns which attack or could potentially infringe upon our national sovereignty or core values, the characteristics of the indigenous fighter are also based upon an equally specific set of variables. Whether a recent eloquent explanation of the Afghan Model's uniqueness and applicability to future combat theaters 11 is accepted, the similarities and differences between Afghanistan and future potential failed state adversaries must neither be overlooked nor over or underestimated throughout theater operations. Just as U.S. post-conflict scenarios have a proposed progression, the leadership of surrogate forces may also have preferences for their post-conflict nation.
Optimally, there would be little divergence between the goals of the United States and those of the failed nation in need. For generations post-conflict, however, the failed state may still not resemble our version of "democracy", but, the absence of chaos, 12 and relative assurances of the known interests and capabilities of that failed state will go a long way to increase the U.S.
sense of security.
10 Record 2-6. 15 The natural wealth of the country not only fuels the conflict and finances these firms, many of which exploit the lack of a solid government (contributing to its nature as a failed state), but also facilitates the introduction of more sophisticated weaponry into the local market and an international dynamic not present in failed states that lack resources.
Special Considerations of Resource Rich Failed States
The identification of significant natural resources, readily exploitable in a failed state due to a lack of governmental controls, facilitates another variable: foreign interest and associated foreign presence. Both Afghanistan and the DROC meet many of Record's characteristics of a failed state that "…have become shelters and breeding grounds for such transnational threats as terrorism, drug-trafficking, refugee generation, environmental degradation, and political and religious extremism…" 16 The abundance of exploitable resources, however, appears to be a key factor which further differentiates these two failed states. The type of resources, their abundance and locations within the country 17 are variables that influence foreign interest in that country when plagued with an internal conflict. Financial benefit will continue to drive foreign activity even when a conflict could foster the development of a failed state which could lead to U.S. intervention.
Unquestionably, the Taliban did exploit whatever they could from Afghanistan, including 'natural resources' from marijuana to precious stones. The financial rewards of this exploitation were used to finance the Taliban regime. The Taliban, however, was more interested in solidifying a terrorist safe haven and base of operations through a forced ideological takeover of the Afghan people than mere exploitation and exportation of 'natural resources'. 18 The Taliban's objective of a protected safe haven and base of operations defined their desire to isolate themselves from the world. This isolation was maintained until the Taliban was ready to introduce the world to their form of self-expression. In resource rich failed states, however, regardless of the level of oppression and violence committed against the populace, the potential wealth to be gained far outweighs any need to adopt an isolationist approach. In fact, The living conditions of those in failed states contribute to their willingness to lead natural resource exploiters to mineral rich areas, mediate and/or barter with local tribes or simply locate water during the dry seasons, thus giving them some form of employment for compensation.
This skill provides some small livelihood through the benefit of foreign capital in the country and provides the locals with the ability to provide basic goods for their families. While this is in no way comparable to that access by government or regional leaders, on a lesser scale it can be compared to the difference in the money obtained by the farmer in the Peruvian hills for harvesting the coca plant versus an alternative crop. It is precisely this residual effect of the foreign investor in resource rich failed states which can negatively impact Phase IV post-conflict operations. It is difficult to proceed with a smooth transition to self-governance when the main source of financial sustenance for the majority of the population no longer exists. While a Phase IV transition may have a set timetable, invariably it will not be expeditious enough when the day-to-day ability to address their basic needs is uncertain.
Another by-product of the resource rich failed state is the quantity and type of weapons available in theater when U.S. forces arrive. In this instance, the resource rich and nonresource rich failed state may share similarities. While weapons, from old Soviet bayonets, Chinese Stinger missiles and rocket-propelled grenades were certainly in abundance in Afghanistan in 2001, similar weapons were available in the DROC, and ran the gamut from primitive to sophisticated. In addition, as previously mentioned, those providing assistance to the foreign resource exploiter, a much sought after occupation, are usually armed and this employment can facilitate the distribution of weapons to more and younger members of the population throughout a wider area in the conflict nation.
A third dynamic is whether the indigenous fighter's nation ever emerged and existed as a viable independent state even though it may have failed in subsequent years. In this aspect, North Korea is different from Iran just as Liberia is from Haiti. The concepts of national pride and identity can lead the surrogate to take on a different perspective and must be considered.
As an example, tribal lineage and appropriate respect is still followed in many African nations, this should be considered when forming indigenous units as it could compromise a potential chain of command. Correspondingly conceptualizing members of an interim administration during the post-conflict phase can also influence success if culture and tribal lineage is considered.
Post-Conflict Obstacles and Benefits of Indigenous Assets
During the post hostilities phase, the cooperation of the indigenous individual may be further delineated along regional tribal allegiances. 
Conclusions
In conclusion, when able to be accessed, the integration of indigenous friendly troops alongside U.S. forces on the battlefield is undoubtedly an asset. In a weak or failed state scenario, the likelihood the number of potential indigenous assets will be numerous and may serve to relieve a "casualty phobic" leadership, especially during initial phases of a campaign.
Characteristically, failed states do not challenge U.S. military might, but rather rely on loosely coordinated and non-conventional tactics carried out by blindly obedient followers in treacherous and confusing terrain. In the new era of asymmetry, however, the rules have 
